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I. INTRODUCTION
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker,
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We
address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never
talk to them of our own necessities but of their own advantages.'
-Adam Smith
A. The Problem - The Litigation Explosion
In our litigious society, "[t]he courts have become the final repositories
of social trust, and they have sought to discharge their duty by holding
accountable those whose trust was not merited."' 2 The volume3 and
complexity of litigation, however, threaten to render our court system
ineffective as the primary dispute resolution mechanism to effectuate
social trust. Although 95 to 99 percent of civil cases are settled before
juries reach their verdicts 4 a massive backlog in the court docket still
exists.' The overwhelming caseload threatens the quality of the decisions
rendered.6
1. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 14 (E. Cannan ed. 1937).
2. J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 186 (1981). Lieberman's explanation of
this statement is that "[Ilitigiousness is not a legal but a social phenomenon. It is born
of a breakdown in community, a breakdown that exacerbates and is exacerbated by the
growth of law. A society that is law saturated inclines toward the belief that in the
absence of law anything goes. No restraints of common prudence, instinctive morality, or
reflected ethics need deter or function. What is not declared unlawful is perforce per-
missible." Id.
3. Studies have indicated that case filings increase when the economy improves and
when judges are added to trial courts. Marvell, Civil Caseloads: The Impact of the
Economy and Trial Judgeship Increases, 69 JUDICATURE 153 (1985). "[A] 10 per cent
rise in a state's economy over each of the prior three years would mean roughly 12 or
13 per cent more trial filings in the current year." Id. "A 10 per cent increase in trial
court judges leads to roughly two per cent more civil trial filings and four per cent more
appeals." Id.
4. J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY 84 (1979).
5. The magnitude of the backlog can be shown by some startling statistics. From 1970
to 1982, the annual number of civil suits filed in federal court doubled to more than
200,000. Thomas, How to Stay Out of Court, MONEY, May, 1983, at 177-78. From June
30, 1980, to June 30, 1985, the number of cases filed annually in federal district courts
alone increased 58.7 percent from 188,487 to 299,164. FEDERAL COURTS: DETERMINING
THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL JUDGES, GAO/GGD-87-26BR, (Jan. 1987). Due to the
increase in cases filed, among other factors, Congress authorized 63 new federal district
court judgeships based upon the 1982 District Courts Biennial Survey. Id. at 11. Congress
had not yet acted upon the 1984 survey recommendation of 66 new judgeships as of
December 1, 1986. Id.
6. Justice Antonin Scalia, in speech before the ABA. N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1987, §
1, at 1, col. 1.
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Litigation is expensive as well as time-consuming. The long period
of discovery between filing and trial consumes clients' financial resources.
As New York attorney Arthur Liman said, "Discovery has become a
narcotic for members of our profession." 7 Finally, augmenting the number
of court personnel in order to deal with increased court filingss absorbs
a large portion of the public purse.9
Due to these problems with court-based litigation, courts, public
agencies, and legislatures have devised, or permitted the use of, various
alternative dispute resolution methods as substitutes or potential sub-
stitutes for actual court-based litigation.'0 Despite the general availability
and advantages of these devices, alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nisms are still not widely used."
This Note will focus on tax incentives as a means of encouraging
use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods and tax disincentives
as a means of discouraging use or protraction of litigation. A fundamental
principle is that human behavior is greatly influenced by the economics
of advantage to one's self;12 consequently, "the mixture of incentives
that currently brings people to court can be changed and barriers to
litigation can be installed in their place."' 3 This Note will first examine
the theory and use of tax incentives to effectuate public policy; second,
examine the economics of the use of litigation and ADR methods; and
third, recommend possible changes in Internal Revenue Code provisions
which could encourage use of ADR methods by business and individuals.
B. A Potential Solution - Alternative Dispute Resolution Methods
Although it is not the purpose of this Note to discuss the benefits
or detriments of ADR methods, 4 a brief introduction to the different
types of ADR methods is in order.
7. Liman, The Quantum of Discovery vs. The Quality of Justice: More is Less, 4
LITIGATION 9 (1977).
8. Marvell indicates that increasing judgeships is partly self-defeating, since more cases
are filed in response to the perception that additional judges reduce delay in the courts.
Marvell, supra note 3, at 153, 155.
9. This fact may be inferred from the massive increase in filings of new cases. See
supra note 5.
10. From 1971 to 1983, forty states established neighborhood justice centers, most of
which are state funded. Thomas, supra note 5, at 177, 180. From 1982 to 1984, "[1]egislators
in some seventeen states [had] enacted at least nineteen laws relating to mediation,"
including appropriations for state funding of mediation, authorization of neighborhood
dispute resolution centers, and comprehensive laws about community mediation, family
and divorce mediation, and small claims and mobile home park mediation. Freedman,
Legislation on Dispute Resolution, 1984 A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION.
Private enterprise has devised the rent-a-judge concept in which a retired judge can be
hired for $150 an hour to help resolve disputes. Thomas, supra note 5, at 178.
11. Hesitancy to use novel forms is not unexpected: See infra text accompanying notes
117-19. The use of alternative forms is increasing, however. For example, over a ten year
264
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Alternative dispute resolution methods can involve the use of attorneys
or other persons as third-party mediators of various types of disputes.
Examples include mediation between spouses or family members, 5 neigh-
bors,16 and small claims contestants. 17 Attorneys also participate in
arbitration proceedings, 18 various types of negotiations,19 and claim set-
tlements in areas such as personal injury0 and debt collection.2' The
proposals made herein are meant to apply to these and other alternative
dispute resolution methods which substitute for court-based litigation.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF TAX PROVISIONS
A. General Economic Theory and the Effect of Taxation Upon Eco-
nomic Decision-Making
The market system assumes persons are rational in their economic
choices.2 2 It assumes that through "selfish" decision-making, economic
actors will engage in "utility maximization," that is, decision-making
period, the number of arbitrations heard by the American Arbitration Association doubled
to 38,000 annually by 1982. Thomas, supra note 5, at 178.
12. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (3d ed. 1986); D. MCCLOSKEY,
THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 1-2 (1982).
13. J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 172.
14. Scholarly treatment of these issues may be found in this and other such law
journals.
15. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.080 (1983); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West 1983 & Supp.
1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 552.501 (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.755 (1984).
16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1143.10 (1980) (repealed 1982); COLO. REv. STAT. §
13-22-301 -22-310 (Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-216 (1982).
17. Arkansas, Kentucky, and Massachusetts have statutes relating to mediation of
small claims. Noted in Freedman, supra note 10, at 1.
18. An insurance company may require, as a term of the contract, for instance, that
an uninsured or under-insured motorist claim by a policyholder be submitted to arbitration.
The arbitration panel may be one in which the insurance company and the policyholder's
attorney each select one attorney to act as arbitrator and, then, those two attorneys select
a third attorney to act as chair of the panel. Counsel for the policyholder-plaintiff and
insurance company-defendant present their cases to the panel, as they would in court,
and the arbitration panel renders a decision as to the amount of damages to be rendered.
19. The attorneys of two companies involved in a contract dispute will, for example,
attempt to negotiate a compromise before resorting to the courts or to another ADR
method.
20. The plaintiff's personal injury lawyer will attempt to negotiate a reasonable
settlement with the insurance company's adjuster; if such negotiations prove unfruitful or
if the statute of limitations draws near, suit would be filed, although settlement could
occur subsequently.
21. Businesses of various kinds often hire attorneys to collect debts owed them. If the
initial demand for payment goes unanswered or answered unsatisfactorily, the business
may resort to the legal system.
22. A. SCHOTIrER, FREE MARKET ECONOMICS 2-3 (1985); R. POSNER, supra note 12,
at 3.
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which results in their greatest satisfaction. 23 Utility maximization is
achieved when an activity is pursued until the marginal benefit of the
activity is equal to the marginal cost of pursuing it further.24 Thus,
when an activity costs more to pursue than the expected benefits to be
derived, a person will cease further pursuit of that activity.25
The utility maximization concept is applicable to litigants' decisions
either to settle a case or to await the jury's verdict. The plaintiff weighs
the cost of prosecuting its suit, the potential benefit to be derived, and
the likelihood it will win.26 On the other hand, the defendant weighs
the cost of defending the potential exposure to damages, and the
likelihood of a defense verdict or the reduction of damages to be realized
by conducting a vigorous defense.27 This cost-benefit decision-making
by both sides may be illustrated as follows:
In a civil case, let the expected judgment be $100,000 and assume that
both parties agree on its size; let the probability that the plaintiff will be
awarded the judgment be .50; let the defendant's trial cost be $10,000; and
let the plaintiff's trial cost be $20,000. If this is the case, the plaintiff's
expected net gain from going to trial is $20,000 and the defendant's expected
costs are $50,000. Since the plaintiff's expected net gain is $20,000 and
the defendant's expected net cost is $50,000 then there is a $30,000 range
within which settlement can occur. That is, the plaintiff will settle for some
amount over $20,000 while the defendant will settle for some amount less
than $50,000.8
Thus, where cost-benefit analysis reveals a range of potential verdicts,
each side may be willing to settle within a certain range.
Likewise, the law affects economic choices persons make concerning
the method of dispute resolution. Economist John MacDonald Oliver
noted that one purpose of laws is to maneuver people into behavior
patterns different from those they would follow in the absence of such
laws.29 Whether or not the law has the explicit purpose of encouraging
or discouraging a specific course of action, economics provide an ex-
planation for the result.3 0 The economic explanation is particularly strong
with respect to tax provisions. The general principle is that "[t]he
imposition of a tax on an activity creates an incentive for people engaged
23. Id. at 2; Zinam, The Roles of Equilibrium, Optimality, Maximization, and
Discontent in Decision-Making Processes, 38 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 163 (1979).
24. D. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 12, at 43.
25. N. MERCURO & T. RYAN, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 119-20 (1984).
26. Id.; Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61, 101-07
(1971).
27. N. MERCURO & T. RYAN, supra note 25, at 119-20; Landes, supra note 26, at
61, 101-07.
28. N. MERCURO & T. RYAN, supra note 25, at 119-20.
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in the activity to substitute another activity that is taxed less heavily."',
The federal income tax system consists of two parts: (1) a basic
system of structural provisions which mechanically imposes taxes in
order to derive public funds without regard to special governmental
policies, and (2) a system of tax expenditures. 32 By use of these two
parts, the tax system attempts to accomplish three primary goals: (1)
to transfer resources from the private to the public sector; (2) to distribute
the cost of government fairly by income classes and among people in
approximately the same economic circumstances; and (3) to promote
economic growth, stability, and efficiency.33 In addition to these broad
policy goals, specific social and economic goals have been aided through
tax expenditure provisions.
B. History and Effect of Tax Incentives
Congress uses tax expenditures to promote various social and policy
objectives considered desirable.34 Tax expenditures are either in the form
of deductions or credits. Deductions reduce the amount of income subject
to the taxpayer's marginal rate, making tax savings equal to the amount
of the deduction times the taxpayer's marginal rate.35 Credits, on the
31. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 364 (2d ed. 1977).
32. Tax expenditures are defined as "those revenue losses attributable to provisions
of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from
gross income or which provides a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral
of tax liability...." Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REv. 705, 706
(1970). See generally S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1985).
33. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 5 (4th ed. 1983).
34. A number of scholars, however, criticize the utility of credits and deductions for
achieving congressional purposes; they argue instead for cash payments. R. P. Hoff, for
example, states that "[a] tax credit is a relatively weak incentive for taxpayers in the
upper income levels and an ineffective equity instrument for taxpayers who have little or
no positive tax liability." In addition, she argues that "[g]iving a credit for a business
expense (e.g., investment expense) separates the concept of income from any notion off
gain; giving a credit for a personal expense (e.g., child and dependent care expense)
separates the concept of income from the notion of ability to pay. Allowing a tax credit
for nonbusiness expenses which otherwise would be allowable only as an itemized deduction
(e.g., for political contributions) circumvents the zero bracket amount. In short, the use
of tax credits to achieve tax equity and nontax incentive goals complicates the tax
computation process without attendant advantage." Hoff, The Appropriate Role for Tax
Credits in an Income Tax System, 35 TAX LAWYER 339, 343, 351. See also generally,
Gottschalk, Deductions Versus Credits Revisited, 29 NATL TAX J. 221 (1976); Sunley,
The Choice Between Deductions and Credits, 30 NATLTAX J. 243 (1977). Surrey concludes
that subsidies or direct governmental expenditures would be more efficient in accomplishing
governmental objectives. Surrey, supra note 32, at 706. He also criticizes tax expenditures
as being of more value to higher income taxpayers; however, in light of the change to
fewer tax brackets for individual income taxes under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, this
inequity is greatly reduced.
35. Sunley, supra note 34, at 243.
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other hand, directly reduce the amount of tax liability.3 6 Whether a
credit or deduction is chosen to effectuate a particular tax expenditure
may be of little consequence because it is possible to calculate the
amount of a credit which would be the equivalent of a deduction such
that the end result (decrease in tax liability) would be the same regardless
of which method is used, assuming the same marginal rate.
37
Since 1962, Congress has enacted numerous credits and deductions
to promote a host of special non-tax purposes:38 employment and job
creation;3 9 aid to certain persons or causes deemed worthy of special
treatment;40 development of energy sources and conservation of energy;
41
home ownership and low-income housing;42 research and development; 43
business development, expansion, and modernization; 44 purchase of con-
sumer and other goods;45 improvement of environmental quality;46 pur-
36. Id.
37. Gottschalk, supra note 34, at 225 (1976).
38. Certain deductions and credits existed prior to 1962; deductions have existed since
at least 1913 and credits since 1924. The greatly heightened use of tax expenditures to
promote particular policies, however, is considered to have begun in 1962. Hoff, supra
note 34, at 348-49, 361.
39. E.g., I.R.C. § 21 (1987) (expenses for household and dependent care services
necessary for gainful employment); I.R.C. § 51-52 (1987) (targeted jobs credit); I.R.C.
§ 176 (1987) (payments with respect to employees of certain foreign corporations); I.R.C.
§ 217 (1987) (moving expenses).
40. E.g., I.R.C. § 22 (1987) (credit for the elderly and the permanently and totally
disabled); I.R.C. § 188 (1987) (earned income credit); I.R.C. § 170 (1987) (charitable
contributions and gifts); I.R.C. § 188 (1987) (amortization of certain expenditures for
child care facilities); I.R.C. § 190 (1987) (expenditures to remove architectural and
transportation barriers to the handicapped and elderly); I.R.C. § 192 (1987) (contributions
to black lung benefit trust); I.R.C. § 215 (1987) (alimony payments).
41. E.g., I.R.C. § 23 (1987) (residential energy credit); I.R.C. § 34 (1987) (certain
uses of gasoline and special fuels); I.R.C. § 40 (1987) (alcohol used as fuel); I.R.C. §
193 (1987) (relating to tertiary injectants).
42. E.g., I.R.C. § 25 (1987) (interest on certain home mortgages); I.R.C. § 42 (1987)
(low income housing credit); I.R.C. § 216 (1987) (deduction of taxes, interest, and business
depreciation by cooperative housing tenant-stockholder).
43. E.g., I.R.C. § 28 (1987) (clinical testing expenses for certain drugs for rare diseases
or conditions); I.R.C. § 41 (1987) (credit for increasing research and development); I.R.C.
§ 174 (1987) (research and experimental expenditures).
44. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 38-39, §§ 46-49 (1987) (general business credits relating to de-
preciable property); I.R.C. § 162 (1987) (trade or business expenses); I.R.C. §§ 167-168,
179 (1987) (depreciation of assets); I.R.C. § 172 (1987) (net operating loss deduction);
I.R.C. § 173 (1987) (circulation expenses for newspapers, etc.); I.R.C. § 178 (1987)
(amortization of cost of acquiring a lease); I.R.C. § 180 (1987) (expenditures by farmers
for fertilizers, etc.); I.R.C. § 184 (1987) (amortization of certain railroad rolling stock);
I.R.C. § 195 (1987) (start-up expenditures); I.R.C. § 196 (1987) (deduction for certain
unused business credits); I.R.C. § 212 (1987) (expenses for production of income); I.R.C.
§§ 243-250 (1987) (special corporate deductions).
45. E.g., I.R.C. § 163 (1987) (interest on indebtedness); I.R.C. § 166 (1987) (bad
debts).
46. E.g., I.R.C. § 169 (1987) (amortization of pollution control facilities); I.R.C. §
175 (1987) (soil and water conservation expenditures); I.R.C. § 194 (1987) (amortization
of reforestation expenditures).
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chase of private, state, and local bonds;47 and various miscellaneous
purposes. 4
The Joint Tax Committee estimated that tax expenditures totalled
$295 billion in 1983 and were projected to be $421 billion in 1988.49
Econometric studies generally indicate that tax incentives encourage
spending patterns deemed by Congress to be socially valuable.5 0 For
example, the tax deduction encourages charitable giving at all income
levels, although the response in the lower income classes is uncertain.5'
The preferential capital gains tax rate52 was justified on the grounds
that an otherwise higher tax rate would reduce the mobility of capital
because investors would "lock-in" their investments over a long period
of time since all gain is "bunched," that is, recognized in the year of
sale.53 Tax preferences for home ownership siphoned off some savings
that otherwise might have been invested in plant and equipment, par-
ticularly in the 1970s when housing prices rose much faster than the
general price level . 4 Tax incentives have also been effective in stimu-
lating investments in historic preservation. Foregone federal tax revenues
were small in comparison to the dollars invested to restore historic
buildings.55 Tax deductions and cost-sharing have promoted soil conser-
vation measures by farmers whose land was eroding, 6 and favorable
taxation of farm capital has tended to contribute to greater farm output.57
Tax code provisions also alter corporate decision-making. For example,
corporations will undertake new investments if the investments promise
to yield a satisfactory rate of return after tax.58
47. E.g., I.R.C. § 171 (1987) (amortizable bond premium); I.R.C. 99 141-150 (1987)
(regarding state and local bonds).
48. E.g., I.R.C. § 104 (1987) (excluding from income compensation for injuries or
sickness); I.R.C. § 165 (1987) (losses not compensated by insurance); I.R.C. § 183 (1987)
(activities not engaged in for profit); I.R.C. § 186 (1987) (excluding from income recoveries
of damages for antitrust violations, etc.); I.R.C. § 213 (1987) (medical, dental, etc.,
expenses); I.R.C. § 219 (1987) (retirement savings); I.R.C. §§ 151-152 (1987) (certain
personal exemptions).
49. A. ANDO, M. BLUME, & I. FRIEND, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF THE U.S.
TAX SYSTEM 2 (1985). The 1988 figure assumed no changes in the 1983 tax law.
50. J. PECHMAN, supra note 33, at 92.
51. Id.
52. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 phased out the capital gains rate but simultaneously
lowered the maximum rate for all income.
53. J. PECHMAN, supra note 33, at I11.
54. Id. at 146.
55. INFORMATION ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION TAx INCENTIVES, GAO/GGD-86-112FS
(Aug. 1, 1986).
56. How TAX INCENTIVES ENCOURAGE SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION INVEST-
MENTS, GAO/GGD-86-116FS (Aug. 13, 1986).
57. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SELECTED CURRENT TAX PROVISIONS ON AGRICULTURE,
GAO/GGD-86-126BR (Aug. 11, 1986).
58. J. PECHMAN, supra note 33, at 142.
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C. Specific Effects of Tax Subsidization on the Use of the Legal
System
The legal system is unique in that it is both a "public good"5 9 and
a "private good."'60 As a public good, the legal system supplies general
legal rules for the benefit of all its citizens. 6' As a private good, albeit
heavily subsidized through taxation, it supplies legal decisions in par-
ticular cases for the benefit of the specific parties involved. An
"externality ' 62 exists in the private good aspect of the legal system
because the cost of the "product" is not fully borne by those using it,63
but is largely borne by society. 64 Externalities are significant in "the
manner in which their existence distorts money prices so that they fail
to indicate the true cost of production or the true benefits. '65 Since
court filing fees and other court costs are relatively nominal compared
to the value of the total services provided, the true cost of these services 66
is reflected as having a "cheaper" price than the services' actual cost.67
Thus, this externality likely has a significant pro-litigation impact on
potential litigants' choice of the legal system over ADR methods.68
Our governmental system bears this cost, however, because "it is
judged infeasible or inexpedient to sell [public goods] ."69 Government
looks beyond the monetary costs of providing a service to nonmonetary
considerations and goals.70 Specifically, it can be argued that taxpayers'
support of the legal system is economically justified because its function
59. "[A] person's consumption of a pure public good does not diminish any other
person's consumption. In addition, once the good is produced, no one can be excluded
from its use." A. SCHOTTER, supra note 22, at 58. Typical examples are police or fire
protection or national defense, which are available to all residents.
60. "A private good has the property that one person's consumption of it totally
precludes anyone else from consuming it." A. SCHOTTER, supra note 22, at 57.
61. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF THE LAW 145-51 (1969), quoted in D. LLOYD &
M. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 192 (5th ed. 1985).
62. A. SCHOTTER, supra note 22, at 28.
63. As examples, the cost of filing a complaint in the Franklin County, Ohio, Municipal
Court is $37.00, plus various minor fees for service of process, etc. The filing fee in the
Fairfield County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas is $60.00, which includes service of
process. Ordinarily, filing subsequent pleadings does not involve a fee.
64. For example, litigants are not billed for the time spent by judges and courthouse
personnel in adjudicating their case.
65. J. OLIVER, supra note 29, at 33 (1979).
66. Court costs are independent of the potential litigant's counsel fees and costs. At
the consultation stage or even at the filing stage, counsel fees and costs would probably
be roughly comparable for ADR or litigation, regardless of which method the client, at
that moment, was considering.
67. See supra notes 63-64.
68. "The effect is embodied in the law of demand: More is demanded of a thing
when its relative price falls." D. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 12, at 19.
69. R. POSNER, supra note 31, at 363.
70. E. GRAMLICH, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 4 (1981).
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is not solely dispute resolution, but also to establish rules71 designed to
guide future conduct 72 of other individuals in society. Consequently, if
litigants had to bear the total cost of litigation, there might not be
enough socially valuable litigation. 73
D. Specific Effects of Tax Provisions on the Use of ADR Methods
The extent and frequency of citizens' use of public resources depends
largely upon the "eligibility" or "access" requirements imposed upon
potential users of those resources. Thus, Nicholas Mercuro and Timothy
Ryan stated:
[L]egal institutions will define and assign status rights which establish
eligibility requirements for individuals to gain access to [public] goods and
resources. This situation may be referred to as "government regulation" in
its broadest sense. Thus legal institutions...affect the final public allocation
and distribution of resources in society.74
The Internal Revenue Code "defines and assigns status rights" with
respect to tax expenditures which affect the choice of traditional litigious
methods of dispute resolution versus the choice of "non-traditional"
ADR methods.
This Note next considers the effect of four Internal Revenue Code
sections on the choice of litigation versus ADR methods. Sections 104(a),
162(a), 212, and 262 of the 1987 Internal Revenue Code are examined
because of their direct applicability75 to the question of whether the
tax system provides incentives to use litigation or provides disincentives
to use ADR methods in the business and personal contexts.
1. Business Expenses Under I.R.C. § 162(a) and § 212. Under I.R.C.
§ 162(a), all "ordinary and necessary" business expenses may be de-
ducted.76 The deduction applies to "expenditures directly connected with
71. An interesting aside is a discussion by Cooter and Kornhauser on the evolving
efficiency of legal rules. As summarized by Schotter, "The evolution in the common law
will not establish the legal rule that is most efficient or wealth maximizing but that over
time a variety of legal rules, some more efficient than others, will come to be used.
Inefficient rules will never be weeded out of the legal system." A. SCHOTrER, supra note
22, at 30, citing Cooter & Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the
Help of Judges? 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980).
72. D. LLOYD & M. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 192 (5th
ed. 1985).
73. 1R POSNER, supra note 31, at 401. See also A. SCHOTTER, supra note 22, at 86.
74. N. MERCURO & T. RYAN, supra note 25, at 30.
75. I.R.C. § 186 (1987), regarding exclusion from income of recoveries of damages
for antitrust and other violations, is not given consideration in this Note. However, because
the purpose of I.R.C. § 186 (1987), is analogous to I.R.C. § 104(a) (1987), I.R.C. § 186
(1987) could be given treatment similar to the proposals made herein for I.R.C. § 104(a)
(1987).
76. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1987) provides in part: "There shall be allowed as a deduction
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business...."
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or pertaining to the taxpayer's trade or business"7 7 and may include "a
reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal
services actually rendered. ' 78 In general, legal expenses are ordinarily
deductible if paid or incurred as a result of some business transaction
or primarily to preserve existing business, reputation, or good will.79
Legal expenses include counsel fees80 plus fees or expenses of accountants,
witnesses, or other persons involved in the preparation and presentation
of the taxpayer's case.8' It is unnecessary that litigation be involved,8 2
and the success or failure of the taxpayer in winning the contention
usually does not affect deductibility.83
Only one reported case specifically considered the issue of deducti-
bility of expenses for arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution
method. In Jay A. Mount v. Commissioner,8 4 the Tax Court determined
that the taxpayer's payment of $185 to an attorney and an arbitrator
to settle a dispute connected with the dissolution of two corporations
in which he had interests was deductible as expenditures which proxi-
mately resulted from business. Mount, his wife, and two other people
had formed two corporations involved in serving as manufacturers' agents.
At the time the corporations were dissolved, Mount received nothing
except one account and one month's salary of $275 from one of the
corporations. Believing that he and his wife were entitled to more, Mount
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1987).
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7 (1987).
79. Certain expenses are not currently deductible expenses, however, and must be
capitalized as capital expenditures. See I.R.C. § 263(a) (1987) and regulations thereunder.
Some expenditures that must be capitalized are legal expenses involved in the acquisition
of property having a useful life beyond the taxable year, Woodward v. Commissioner,
397 U.S. 572 (1970); bankruptcy proceedings, Ringmaster, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21
T.C.M. (CCH) 1024 (1962); condemnation proceedings, Isaac G. Johnson & Co. v. United
States, 149 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1945); reorganization of the capital structure of a corporation,
Rev. Rul. 67-125, 1967-1 C.B. 31; for trademark protection, Rust-Oleum Corp. v. United
States, 280 F. Supp. 296 (N.D. Ill. 1967); acquiring a capital asset, John C. Smith II,
36 T.C.M. (CCH) 932 (1977) and Lester Kisska, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1651 (1981); for
removing cloud from title to mineral rights, Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 150
F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 755 (1945), rev'd, 328 U.S. 25 (1946).
80. See Tennessee Valley Leather Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 396 (1949);
Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 1081 (1957); George S. Viereck v. Com-
missioner, 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 1026 (1945); San Marco Shop, Inc. v. Commissioner, 12
T.C.M. (CCH) 843 (1953).
81. See Meyer & Bro. Co., 4 B.T.A. 481 (1920); Mattie W. Budreau v. United States,
52 Am. F. Tax Rep. 1274 (CCH) (1957).
82. E.g., Superheater Co., 12 B.T.A. 5 (1920); O'Day Investment Co., 13 B.T.A. 1230
(1928); Florists' Transworld Delivery Ass'n v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 333 (1976); Henry
M. Rodney, 53 T.C. 287 (1969); Langford Investment Co., 28 B.T.A. 222 (1933).
83. See, e.g., Glynn W. Keeling, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 954 (1971); Longhorn Portland
Cement Co., 3 T.C. 310 (1944), rev'd 148 F.2d 276 (1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728
(1945).
84. 5 T.C.M. (CCH) 1004 (1946).
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engaged the services of an attorney for $500 and an arbitrator for
$375.85 The tax court's opinion stated that:
[W]e see no difference in principle between the situation here and the
partnership account involved in Kornhauser v. U.S., 276 U.S. 145, in which
attorney's fees were held a deductible business expense. The expenditures
here involved were "directly connected with" or "proximately resulted from"
the business, within the meaning of the Kornhauser case, and are, we think,
a proper deduction .... 86
Thus, the tax code, as interpreted by the Tax Court, makes no preference
between business expenditures for litigation and ADR methods since
both are equally deductible from gross income.
I.R.C. § 21281 operates similarly to § 262, except that § 212 is
concerned with the activities of individuals in non-business but profit-
oriented activities.88 To qualify for a deduction under § 212, the taxpayer
"must satisfy the same requirements that apply to a trade or business
expense under § 162 except that the person claiming the deduction
need not be in a trade or business."89 The mechanics of § 212 operate
somewhat differently from § 162 in that § 212 deductions are generally
itemized deductions while § 162 deductions are excluded from the
computation of gross income.90
2. Personal Legal Expenditures Under LR.C. § 262. Under I.R.C.
§ 262,91 legal expenditures incurred for personal benefit, such as divorce,
criminal defense, and personal injury suits, are non-deductible personal
expenses. 92 One exception to this rule is that legal fees incurred in
obtaining alimony payments pursuant to a divorce or separation pro-
ceeding are "ordinary and necessary expenses...for production or col-
lection of income" and, therefore, are deductible by the payor of such
legal fees under I.R.C. § 215 provided the alimony is includable in the
recipient's gross income under I.R.C. § 71.91 Consequently, under the
85. Id. at 1007.
86. Id. at 1008.
87. I.R.C. § 212 (1987) provides in part that: "[I]n the case of an individual, there
shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year-(l) for the production or collection of income; (2) for the
management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income...."
88. S. GUERIN & P. POSTLEWAITE, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 699 (1986).
89. Snyder v. United States, 674 F.2d 1359, 1364 (10th Cir. 1982) (quoting Fischer
v. United States, 490 F.2d 218, 222 (7th Cir. 1973)).
90. S. GUERIN & P. POsTLEwAITE, supra note 88, at 699.
91. I.R.C. § 262 (1987) provides that: "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this
chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses."
92. Examples of non-deductible personal legal expenditures include fees paid to settle
a suit for wrongful expenditure of funds, Sheldon Solomon v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M.
(CCH) 588 (1974), and recover damages to personal auto seized by a foreign country,
Gurry v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 1237 (1933).
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(7) (1987).
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tax code, neither litigation nor ADR is given preference since neither
is deductible from gross income.
3. Damages and Awards Under LR.C. § 104(a). Under I.R.C. §
104(a), 94 compensatory damages for tortious personal injuries95 are
excludable96 from income.97 According to the Internal Revenue Service,
punitive damages are includable in gross income whether the award is
for personal injuries98 or for injury to the taxpayer's business and
professional reputation.99 To be excludable, the amounts must be received
"through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort-
type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of
such prosecution."00 The settlement may be made in a lump sum or
in periodic payments.'0' Again, neither litigation nor ADR methods enjoy
a tax advantage since compensatory awards from both methods are
excludable from gross income.
94. I.R.C. § 104(a) (1987) provides, in pertinent part, that: "[G]ross income does not
include-(1) amounts received under workmen's compensation acts as compensation for
personal injuries or sickness; (2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit
or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal
injuries or sickness...."
95. For an excellent discussion of the confusion in the courts as to what damages for
personal injuries are excludable, see Henry, Torts and Taxes, Taxes and Torts: The
Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 23 Hous. L. REv. 701 (1986).
96. "Exclusions" are "accessions to wealth" which permanently bypass taxation by
specific statutory provision due to some policy consideration. S. GUERIN & P. POSTLEWAITE,
supra note 88, at 115. Exclusions like the exemption of personal injury compensation
from taxation are not "tax expenditures" since the policy rationale for the provision is,
assuredly, not the promotion of personal injuries. However, certain exclusions, in some
circumstances, arguably may have the effect of promoting certain activities just as tax
expenditures do. The exclusion for interest derived from state and municipal bonds, for
instance, undoubtedly lowers their cost to investors and, therefore, makes such bonds more
attractive investments.
97. I.R.C. § 104(a) prevents a "double deduction" by disallowing a deduction for that
portion of the compensatory award which is for medical and other expenses which were
deducted in a prior taxable year pursuant to I.R.C. § 213 (1987): "Except in the case
of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed under section 213
(relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year..... I.R.C. § 104 (1987).
98. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
99. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-37 I.R.B. 7. The Ninth Circuit, however, has taken the
contrary view: "This injury to the person should not be confused with the derivative
consequences of the defamatory attack, Le., the loss of reputation in the community and
any resulting loss of income. The nonpersonal consequences of a personal injury, such as
a loss of future income, are often the most persuasive means of proving the extent of
the injury that was suffered." Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 699 (9th Cir.
1983).
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.04-1(c) (1987). The regulation does not extend this requirement
to workmen's compensation payments.
101. Rev. Rul. 77-230, 1977-2 C.B. 214; Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74; Rev. Rul.
79-313, 1979-2 C.B. 75.
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III. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
A. Proposed Changes to the Internal Revenue Code
Herein are proposed changes to federal income tax sections which
affect the decision to litigate or not litigate. Current text is in Roman
characters and proposed changes are in italics.
§ 162. Trade or business expenses
(a) In general. - There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business, including -
(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for
personal services actually rendered, except:
(A) Costs of alternative dispute resolution methods shall be deductible
for one hundred twenty percent of cost if such alternative dispute
resolution method resolves a dispute prior to commencement of a civil
action under rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or under
a similar state rule;
(B) Costs of prosecuting a civil action shall be deductible -
(i) in full if settled by the parties after commencement of a civil
action under rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or under
a similar state rule, but prior to commencement of discovery by the
taxpayer under rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or similar state rules;
(ii) for eighty percent of cost if settled by the parties after the
taxpayer has commenced discovery under rules 26 through 37 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar state rules but before
commencement of trial under rules 38 through 53 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or under similar state rules.
(iii) for sixty percent of cost if settled by the parties after trial
has commenced under rules 38 through 53 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or under similar state rules but before the jury or
court has returned its verdict.
(iv) for forty percent of cost if the civil action is concluded by a
verdict or if the taxpayer appeals the verdict.
[The remainder of §162 has been omitted.]
§ 212. Expenses for production of income
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year-
(1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property
held for the production of income;
(3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any
tax;
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(4) except that, with respect to the cost of resolving a dispute, costs
of alternative dispute resolution methods shall be deductible for one
hundred twenty percent of cost if such alternative dispute resolution
method resolves a dispute prior to commencement of a civil action
under rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or under a similar
state rule;
(5) except that, with respect to the cost of prosecuting a civil action
related to the income-producing activity-
(a) the costs shall be deductible in full if settled by the parties
after commencement of a civil action under rule 3 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or under a similar state rule, but prior to com-
mencement of discovery by the taxpayer under rules 26 through 37 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar state rules;
(b) the costs shall be deductible for eighty percent of cost if settled
by the parties after the taxpayer has commenced discovery under rules
26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar state
rules but before commencement of trial under rules 38 through 53 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or under similar state rules;
(c) the costs shall be deductible for sixty percent of cost if settled
by the parties after trial has commenced under rules 38 through 53
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or under similar state rules
but before the jury or court has returned its verdict.
(d) the costs shall be deductible for forty percent of cost if the
civil action is concluded by a verdict or if the taxpayer appeals the
verdict.
§ 262. Personal, living, and family expenses
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction
shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.
No deduction shall be allowed for costs incurred in the prosecution
or defense of any civil action; however, there shall be allowed as a
deduction fifty percent of the costs of prosecuting or defending a dispute
resolved under alternative dispute resolution methods. This deduction
shall not apply to costs incurred in prosecuting or defending a criminal
case.
§ 104. Compensation for injuries or sickness
(a) In general. - Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and
not in excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to
medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does
not include-
(2) the amount of any damages received-
(a) by suit, whether as lump sums or as periodic payments, on
account of personal injuries or sickness;0 2
(b) by agreement, whether as lump sums or as periodic payments,
on account of personal injuries or sickness, 03 and the taxpayer may
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also deduct from gross income an amount equal to twenty percent oJ
the amount of the damages received therefrom.
B. Explanation of Proposal
1. § 162 and § 212. A graduated scale of deductibility is proposed
for business expenditures incurred in prosecution of a civil suit, with
the percentage dependent upon the stage at which the suit is settled.
Under proposed § 162(a)(1)(A) and (B) and proposed § 214(4) and (5),
a schedule of deductibility is based on when a civil action is settled.
In brief form, the schedule is as follows:
Percentage Point at Which the Suit is Settled
120% For use of ADR methods in any dispute for which a civil
action is never filed
100% Settlement between filing of civil action and commencement
of discovery
80% Settlement after commencement of discovery and before
commencement of trial
60% Settlement after commencement of trial but before jury or
court has returned its verdict
40% If suit is concluded by verdict or is appealed
The percentages listed are completely arbitrary; they could easily be
adjusted. The idea is to establish quantifiable thresholds at which a
particular strategy decision has a dollar cost both directly, "How much
will it cost to continue?," and indirectly, "Of the total cost, how much
will not be deductible?" In theory, this would tend to encourage set-
tlement of cases when a low marginal additional benefit would discourage
a party from proceeding to the next stage of litigation. This assumes,
however, that people can accurately and rationally weigh the effect of
current out-of-pocket costs versus the future net tax benefit which is
always less than the out-of-pocket costs. 104 In addition, from an accounting
standpoint, the gain in revenues from the damages recovered may be
significantly reduced by the expenses, such as legal expenses and income
taxes incurred in, or as a result of, obtaining damages. 0 5
The operation of the proposal may be explained as follows: Assume
that a dispute involves a breach of contract where the maximum damages
102. This language is changed from present I.R.C. § 104 (1987) in that the substantive
law relating to compensation "by suit" is made a separate section from that relating to
compensation "by agreement." The substantive provision is, however, the same as current
law.
103. The non-italicized text is changed from present I.R.C. § 104 (1987) in that the
substantive law relating to compensation "by agreement" is made a separate section from
that relating to compensation "by suit." The non-italicized substantive provision is, however,
the same as current law.
104. See text and talbles which follow.
105. See text and tables which follow. ,1,YY
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will be $10,000. Since recoveries for non-tortious injuries are includable
in gross income, the additional benefit to be derived (i.e., a larger
damages award) from one stage of litigation to the next must at least
equal the loss to be incurred from the decreased deductibility of the
litigation's costs and the increased out-of-pocket expenses. The examples
of mathematical calculations which follow-from the plaintiff's per-
spective-are based upon the following assumptions: 0 6
Stage I - § 162(a)(1)(A) or § 212(4):
If negotiating costs prior to filing of the civil action are $1,000.00,
then $1,200.00 is deductible as 120 percent of the cost incurred.
Stage 2 - § 162(a)(1)(B)(i) or § 212(5)(a):
Assume that the costs of negotiating, between the time of filing
the civil action and commencement of discovery, added another
$1,000.00 in costs, for a total of $2,000.00.
Stage 3 - § 162(a)(1)(B)(ii) or § 212(5)(b):
Assume that costs between the commencement of discovery and
commencement of trial added another $1,000.00 in costs, for a total
of $3,000.00.
Stage 4 - § 162(a)(1)(B)(iii) or § 212(5)(c):
Assume that costs between the commencement of trial and return
of the court's or jury's verdict added another $1,000.00 in costs, for
a total of $4,000.00.
Stage 5 - § 162(a)(1)(B)(iv) or § 212(5)(d):
Assume that another $1,000.00 in costs is added due to appeal
of the verdict, for a total of $5,000.00.
From these assumptions, the following calculations illustrate the effect
of the proposed changes to Sections 162 and 212:
Lost
Net Out-Of
Gain In Amount Taxable Net Tax Pocket
Taxable of Gross In- Increase Expenses Net Gain
Stages Income'0 7 Deduction come 10o 109 110 111
One $10,000 $1,200 $8,800 $3,388 $1,000 $5,612
Two $10,000 $2,000 $8,000 $3,080 $2,000 $4,920
Three $10,000 $2,400 $7,600 $2,926 $3,000 $4,074
Four $10,000 $2,400 $7,600 $2,926 $4,000 $3,074
Five $10,000 $2,000 $8,000 $3,080 $5,000 $1,920
106. The assumptions made are purely arbitrary.
107. This figure represents the damages recovered.
108. This figure represents the gain in taxable income (the damages recovered) minus
the amount of the deduction.
109. This assumes that the net taxable income is taxed at the rate of 38.5 percent,
which is the maximum tax rate for individuals for tax years beginning 1987. I.R.C. § 1
(1987).
110. This figure represents the cost of litigation.
111. This figure represents the gain in taxable income minus the net tax increase
minus the lost out-of-pocket expenses.
278
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Thus, from an accounting standpoint," 2 the plaintiff that accurately
estimates the net benefit to be derived from pursuing litigation from
one stage to the next would be wise to settle before the civil action is
filed. This conclusion is also true under present tax law; however, current
law preserves more of the net, after-tax gain from litigation in the
taxpayer's pocket. The outcomes under present law is illustrated below:
Net Lost
Gain In Amount Taxable Out-Of
Taxable of Gross Net Tax Pocket
Stages Income Deduction Income Increase Expenses Net Gain
One $10,000 $1,000 $9,000 $3,465 $1,000 $5,535
Two $10,000 $2,000 $8,000 $3,080 $2,000 $4,920
Three $10,000 $3,000 $7,000 $2,695 $3,000 $4,305
Four $10,000 $4,000 $6,000 $2,310 $4,000 $3,690
Five $10,000 $5,000 $5,000 $1,925 $5,000 $3,075
Now, assume that the plaintiff estimated that the potential damages to
be recovered could be more than $10,000. The plaintiff's decision to
advance from one stage of litigation to the next should be dependent
upon whether the additional gain in net after-tax income would result
in a gain greater or equal to the gain to be derived if the civil action
were settled prior to filing suit."3 The following table illustrates the
increase in potential recoverable damages necessary to achieve such a
result:
Net Lost
Gain In Amount Taxable Out-Of
Taxable of Gross Net Tax Pocket
Stages Income Deduction Income Increase Expenses Net Gain
One $10,000 $1,200 $ 8,800 $3,388 $1,000 $5,612
Two $11,125 $2,000 $ 9,125 $3,513 $2,000 $5,612
Three $12,750 $2,400 $10,100 $3,888 $3,000 $5,612
Four $14,126 $2,400 $11,726 $4,514 $4,000 $5,612
Five $16,003"1 $2,000 $14,003 $5,391 $5,000 $5,612
Thus, in order for the plaintiff-taxpayer to deem it valuable to advance
from one stage of litigation to the next, the potential recoverable damages,
labeled net gain in taxable income, would have to increase sufficiently
to allow at least the $5,612 recoverable by settlement before com-
mencement of litigation.
112. By this I mean that the benefit or efficiency of additional litigation-the income
to be derived-is judged on a cost basis, that is, how much does it cost to obtain the
income received. What would the balance sheet look like? In Stage One, for instance,
the income (settlement of $10,000) is partly offset by expenses of $1,000 (counsel fee)
and $3,388 (net increase in income tax), for a total net benefit of that $10,000 award
being only $5,612.
113. This assumes that the defendant would be willing to settle for the minimum
damages amount of $10,000.
114. Unless the court of appeals orders modification of the trial award to this amount,
279
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The intent of the "by the taxpayer" language in the proposal is to
temper the effect of diminished deductibility on parties who do not
initiate the suit. For example, a party would not face coercion to settle
by a threat to "commence discovery," because the threatened party
would not slip to the 80% deductibility level until commencing his own
discovery. This threshold concept would also be the same for each party
in the multi-party context.
Several problems develop, however, for which Treasury regulations
would be needed to provide clarification. "Alternative dispute resolution
methods" would need to be defined, at least in general terms. ADR
would need to be defined so as to exclude legal fees not incurred in
relation to a pending dispute. Also, since litigation ordinarily lasts more
than one year, especially where appeals are involved, how the proposed
statute should be applied since, as written, it does not supply methodology
for deductibility under those circumstances, must be considered.
2. § 262 Personal, living, and family expenses. The proposed additions
to this section would continue to deny deductibility of costs incurred
in court system litigation, as does the present law. This preserves the
status quo policy that personal expenses are non-deductible unless given
special statutory treatment."15 The section would be changed, however,
to permit deduction of fifty percent of the costs incurred in resolving
a dispute under alternative dispute resoluti6n methods. Again, the pro-
posed percentage is completely arbitrary. The idea is to establish a
quantifiable threshold at which a particular strategy decision has a dollar
cost both directly (How much will it cost to sue?) and indirectly (If I
resolved the dispute by a method other than lawsuit, how much could
I deduct? How much would this decrease my ultimate tax liability?).
This proposed section is not written with the same complexity of the
business deduction sections in order to preserve, albeit in a small way,
some simplicity in the tax code as it relates to individual taxpayers.
This approach, however, results in some inequity as the commencement
and completion of a civil action is necessary, in certain situations, to
determine the legal rights or status of the parties. For example, a divorce
may be obtained only through a civil action. Consequently, for taxpayers
whose legal rights must necessarily be determined through the court
system, the deduction would be unavailable.
3. § 104(a). Compensation for injuries or sickness. The proposed
amendment to Section 104(a) is, unlike the rest of the provision, a tax
expenditure. The proposal operates simply. For example, assume that
the appeal would result in a decrease in net income below the $5,612 figure. If the
defendant appealed, then the plaintiff would be wise to attempt to settle for an amount
between $14,376 and $16,003, under these facts.
115. S. GUERIN & P. POSTLEWAITE, supra note 88, at 441.
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the attorney for the injured person obtains from the potential defendant's
insurance company an acceptable settlement offer of $5,000. Under
current law, if the injured person accepts that offer, he would exclude
the $5,000.00 from his gross income. Under the proposal, he would
exclude the $5,000.00 from his gross taxable income and deduct an
additional 20 percent of that amount ($1,000.00) from his gross income.
Under these facts, that deduction would result in a net tax savings of
from $110.00 to $385.00, depending on the taxpayer's tax bracket.116
This savings would, in effect, increase the size of the settlement award
2.2 percent for taxpayers in the lowest tax bracket and 7.7 percent for
taxpayers in the highest tax bracket.
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE TAX PREFERENCE APPROACH
A. Can the Tax Preference Approach Work?
Some may argue that the tax preference approach is unlikely to
directly result in increased use of ADR methods. It may be that
widespread use of court-centered litigation 1 7 is based upon legal prac-
titioners' familiarity with it and the novelty of new organized ADR
methods:
With "innovative but not well-known procedures... [parties] are unlikely to
give them a try unless they are officially recognized and sanctioned.... By
their very nature, most new and somewhat unorthodox alternatives will be
appropriate only in select circumstances; however, in these circumstances,
they may represent the best solution. Also, as time passes, such alternatives
may gain wider acceptance and be considered appropriate in a greater
number of cases." 18
In addition, other unresolved questions remain, such as the legal en-
forceability of decisions or agreements reached by ADR methods. 119
B. Questions Left Unanswered
Before adopting a policy, a decision-maker wants to know the benefits
and costs of the proposed policy. The method of evaluation, from a
strictly economic standpoint, is "[i]n any choice situation, select the
116. For tax years beginning in 1987, individual tax rates range from 11 percent to
38.5 percent. I.R.C. § 1 (1987).
117. The term "court-centered litigation" is used as a reminder that ADR forms such
as arbitration are often merely trials outside of the courthouse.
118. Freedman, supra note 10, at second page prior to i.
119. This subject is discussed in Burns, The Enforceability of Mediated Agreements:
An Essay on Legitimation and Process Integrity, 2 OHIO ST. J. Dis. REs. 93 (1986) and
in Bernstein, The Desirability of a Statute for the Enforcement of Mediated Agreements,
2 OHIO ST. J. Dis. REs. 117 (1986).
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(policy) alternative that produces the greatest net benefit."' 120 From this
seemingly straightforward prescription arises a host of complex evalu-
ations to confront the economic analyst and policymaker regarding the
proposals contained herein:
1. How much loss in revenue to the federal government will occur
from the tax incentives/disincentives?
2. How much will these provisions save in dollars for (1) the federal
court system and (2) state court systems?
3. How much will these provisions reduce the backlog in (1) the
federal court system and (2) state court systems? Will the savings
restrain the need for additional judges?
4. How much will potential or actual litigants save in (1) dollars,
(2) time and inconvenience, or (3) other values?
5. As a type of indirect intergovernmental grant program, 121 does the
revenue loss accurately reflect the gains federal and state courts receive
from decreased usage of court time and resources?
6. Do the ADR methods provide the (1) same or better quality, or
(2) consistency of decisions as litigation?
7. Should we encourage people to not use the court system?
This Note represents merely the beginning of a discussion of the
economic, tax, and policy implications of adopting such a proposal.
Nevertheless, a tentative conclusion may be reached.
V. CONCLUSION
Some may argue that tax expenditures are inappropriate because
such preferences or "loopholes" are contrary to the goals of reform and
simplification of the tax system. Some scholars, such as Wharton School
economists Ando, Blume, and Friend conclude that "[tiaxes undoubtedly
provide some disincentives to the economic activity being taxed, but
there is no strong evidence that these disincentives in the aggregate are
very substantial."'' 22 Policymakers must believe it is true, however,
because even after passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, many
deductions, credits, and exclusions still exist.123
120. E. GRAMLICH, supra note 70, at 43, (quoting E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER,
A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 137 (1978)).
121. Intergovernmental grant programs generally transfer federal revenues to state or
local governments (or state transfers to local governments) for the purpose of carrying
out a general or specific program in lieu of the grantor government doing it. Tax provisions,
such as those proposed in Part III, could be considered an indirect grant because of their
presumed incentive effect to reduce private individuals' usage of state resources in the
form of court time and resources.
122. A. ANDO, M. BLUME, & I. FRIEND, supra note 49, at 6.
123. See supra notes 39-48.
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because even after passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, many
deductions, credits, and exclusions still exist. 123
Litigation is the nobleman to which all attorneys must acknowledge.
In Joseph Raz's words,
Lawyers' activities are dominated by litigation in court, actual or potential.
They not only conduct litigation in the courts. They draft documents,
conclude legal transactions, advise clients, etc., always with an eye to the
likely outcome of possible litigation in which the validity of the document
or transaction or the legality of the client's action may be called into
question."'
Litigation, whether potential or actual, has a pervasive influence upon
the legal community and its clients. If we accept the crisis-character-
ization made by former United States Deputy Attorney General Laurence
H. Siberman, that "[t]he legal process, because of its unbridled growth,
has become a cancer which threatens the vitality of our forms of
capitalism and democracy[,]"'1 25 then we should adopt one or more cures
for that crisis.
We have a choice, as James M. Buchanan persuasively stated: "Men
must look at all institutions as potentially improvable. Man must adopt
the attitude that he can control his fate; he must accept the necessity
of choosing. He must look on himself as a man, not another animal,
and upon 'civilization' as if it is of his own making."'126
Therefore, we are left with the problem of choosing appropriate
institutional arrangements for shaping the character of our economic
and legal life.' 27 Tax law changes may be the least obtrusive means to
effect a change in marketplace decision-making which now overwhelm-
ingly chooses litigation.
Claire J. Prechtel
123. See supra notes 39-48.
124. Raz, The Problem About the Nature of Law, 3 CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY,
(quoted in D. LLOYD & M. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 477
(5th ed. 1985)).
125. Silberman, Will Lawyering Strangle Democratic Capitalism? REG., Mar./Apr.
1978, at 15.
126. Buchanan, Law and the Invisible Hand, THE INTERACTION OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 127 (B. Siegan ed. 1977).
127. N. MERCURO & I. RYAN, supra note 25, at 37.
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